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RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG 8131
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 4102
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0329
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 4757
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 007199

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [CO](#)
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT URIBE ADVISOR ON GOC OUTREACH TO THE FARC

REF: BOGOTA 6874

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Advisor Fabio Valencia outlined President Uribe's efforts to convey to the FARC his willingness to discuss a humanitarian accord or a broader peace deal, but was skeptical the FARC would enter serious negotiations without further GOC military pressure. He agreed the ELN and FARC could receive an amnesty as part of any eventual peace deal, and said such terms would then be extended to the demobilized paramilitaries. End Summary

¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor on Economic Competitiveness and informal advisor on the FARC Fabio Valencia told Ambassador Wood August 1 that President Uribe is reaching out to the FARC through the Catholic Church, the international community, and other interlocutors to convey the GOC's willingness to discuss with the FARC either a humanitarian accord or a broader peace deal. Uribe wants to end the conflict, but in a way that is consistent with his &democratic security8 strategy. Valencia*who participated in President Pastrana's peace negotiations with the FARC from 1998-2002*said communications with the FARC are difficult, and voiced skepticism about the group's willingness to seriously engage the GOC at this time. He said the GOC would need to put more military pressure on the FARC, before it would enter into talks.

¶3. (C) Valencia said it is key that the international community support the GOC and resist FARC overtures. A positive result of the failed Pastrana process was the tougher stance taken by European and Latin countries toward the FARC. The recent FARC letter to the European Union asking to be removed from the EU's list of terrorist organizations was a classic FARC attempt to receive something for nothing. If the international community responded positively, it would undercut the GOC's efforts. He said the international community should stress to the FARC that any improvement in relations would be linked to FARC actions in a peace process with the GOC.

¶4. (C) The Ambassador said the refusal of the FARC and ELN to accept the Justice and Peace Law could contaminate the current AUC peace process. If demobilized ELN or FARC members received amnesty as part of a peace process, the demobilized paramilitaries would expect the same treatment. Valencia agreed the ELN and FARC would insist on better terms than the paramilitaries, and would likely receive a better

deal. Under the principle of favorability, the GOC would be forced to extend these terms to the former paramilitaries. He asked the United States to help prepare the international community to accept such an eventual outcome.

WOOD